Double-Cross System by MASTERMAN J.C

Author:MASTERMAN, J.C. [MASTERMAN, J.C.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: History
ISBN: 9780762772810
Goodreads: 11202577
Publisher: Lyons Press
Published: 1972-02-16T00:00:00+00:00

8: Developments in 1942

THE EARLY PART OF 1942 WAS TO SOME EXTENT A PERIOD OF frustration. Those who knew most about the working of double agents felt most strongly that the weapon in our hands was not being sufficiently used. If reference is made once more to the objects of the double-cross system on page 61, it can readily be understood that the counterespionage objects had been to a large extent achieved but that very little had been done, compared to what seemed possible, on the side of intelligence and deception. We felt increasingly convinced that insufficient attention was paid to the intelligence information which could be deduced from questionnaires, and still more that inadequate use was made of the system to pass over misinformation to the enemy and to practise deception upon him. Moreover, however efficiently M.I.5 and M.I.6 might control their agents, it was impossible for them to improve the work in these particular spheres of activity without more guidance from higher authority.

Efforts were made to secure directives from the service members of the Twenty Committee which would enable us to pursue a more aggressive policy. It was pointed out that, if indeed we controlled the German intelligence system in this country and were in almost daily communication by wireless with the Germans, it was inconceivable that we could not, if we used our imagination and ingenuity, affect German policy to our own advantage. A second criticism, made by the head of B.1.A, was that, as things had worked out, we were not really in touch with the proper higher authorities. In his view, if the system was to be actively used, we ought to have been attached to Operations rather than (or as well as) to Intelligence in order that we might effectively further operational plans by deceptive methods.

The attempt to secure better directives was not very successful. On the civil side, the policy of Home Defence Executive was necessarily defensive, and their directive therefore amounted to little more than an instruction to us to avoid giving accurate information about damage to industrial objectives whenever possible and to avoid pinpointing industrial objectives. Civilian morale was to be written up as far as possible, although in fact evidences of high morale would be the last things that a real spy would report. Though, therefore, H.D.E. was a firm supporter of the system and anxious to build up the agents for the future, it could help us very little at the beginning of 1942.

The War Office also wished morale, training, equipment, and so forth to be written up as far as possible and considered it the wrong moment to embark on more exciting plans. Home Forces pointed out clearly that it was useless to control the enemy’s espionage system if the danegeld of good information was too high; that since operational plans were still fluid, it was difficult to use the agents adequately for misinformation; and that, in consequence, we ought to consider whether better results would not be

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